Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 191 results for "David Nortes-Martinez" clear search

PercolationPrice

Paolo Zeppini Koen Frenken Luis Izquierdo | Published Thursday, December 21, 2017 | Last modified Thursday, May 03, 2018

This model simulate product diffusion on different social network structures.

Peer reviewed Avian pest control: Yield outcome due to insectivorous birds, falconry, and integration of nest boxes.

David Jung | Published Monday, November 13, 2023 | Last modified Sunday, November 19, 2023

The model aims to simulate predator-prey relationships in an agricultural setting. The focus lies on avian communities and their effect on different pest organisms (here: pest birds, rodents, and arthropod pests). Since most case studies focused on the impact on arthropod pests (AP) alone, this model attempts to include effects on yield outcome. By incorporating three treatments with different factor levels (insectivorous bird species, falconry, nest box density) an experimental setup is given that allows for further statistical analysis to identify an optimal combination of the treatments.
In light of a global decline of birds, insects, and many other groups of organisms, alternative practices of pest management are heavily needed to reduce the input of pesticides. Avian pest control therefore poses an opportunity to bridge the disconnect between humans and nature by realizing ecosystem services and emphasizing sustainable social ecological systems.

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Complex Networks with Agents' Adaptive Expectations

Bo Xianyu | Published Wednesday, November 16, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

An Agent-Based Model of Internet Diffusion Under General and Specific Network Externalities

Filiz Garip | Published Friday, April 27, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

Using nodes from the 2002 General Social Survey sample, the code establishes a network of ties with a given homophily bias, and simulates Internet adoption rates in that network under three conditions: (i) no network externalities, (ii) general network externalities, where an individual’s reservation price is a function of the overall adoption rate in the network, (iii) specific network externalities, where reservation price is a function of the adoption rate in individual’s personal […]

In order to test how prosocial strategies (compassionate altruism vs. reciprocity) grow over time, we developed an evolutionary simulation model where artificial agents are equipped with different emotionally-based drivers that vary in strength. Evolutionary algorithms mimic the evolutionary selection process by letting the chances of agents conceiving offspring depend on their fitness. Equipping the agents with heritable prosocial strategies allows for a selection of those strategies that result in the highest fitness. Since some prosocial attributes may be more successful than others, an initially heterogeneous population can specialize towards altruism or reciprocity. The success of particular prosocial strategies is also expected to depend on the cultural norms and environmental conditions the agents live in.

This model is designed to show the effects of personality types and student organizations have on ones chance to making friendships in a university setting. As known from psychology studies, those that are extroverted have an easier chance making friendships in comparison to those that are introverted.
Once every tick a pair of students (nodes) will be randomly selected they will then have the chance to either be come friends or not (create an edge or not) based on their personality type (you are able to change what the effect of each personality is) and whether or not they are in the same club (you can change this value) then the model triggers the next tick cycle to begin.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Ecological Communities: Testing Constraint Closure

Steve Peck | Published Sunday, December 06, 2020 | Last modified Friday, April 16, 2021

Ecosystems are among the most complex structures studied. They comprise elements that seem both stable and contingent. The stability of these systems depends on interactions among their evolutionary history, including the accidents of organisms moving through the landscape and microhabitats of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic conditions in which they occur. When ecosystems are stable, how is that achieved? Here we look at ecosystem stability through a computer simulation model that suggests that it may depend on what constrains the system and how those constraints are structured. Specifically, if the constraints found in an ecological community form a closed loop, that allows particular kinds of feedback may give structure to the ecosystem processes for a period of time. In this simulation model, we look at how evolutionary forces act in such a way these closed constraint loops may form. This may explain some kinds of ecosystem stability. This work will also be valuable to ecological theorists in understanding general ideas of stability in such systems.

Mobility USA (MUSA)

Davide Natalini Giangiacomo Bravo | Published Sunday, December 08, 2013 | Last modified Monday, December 30, 2013

MUSA is an ABM that simulates the commuting sector in USA. A multilevel validation was implemented. Social network with a social-circle structure included. Two types of policies have been tested: market-based and preference-change.

The model represents an archetypical fishery in a co-evolutionary social-ecological environment, capturing different dimensions of trust between fishers and fish buyers for the establishment and persistence of self-governance arrangements.

This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.

Displaying 10 of 191 results for "David Nortes-Martinez" clear search

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