Computational Model Library

Displaying 7 of 7 results prisoners dilemma clear

The simulation experiment is for studying the influence of external supervision services on combating corruption.
Algorithm: evolutionary game theory

EthnoCultural Tag model (ECT)

David Hales Bruce Edmonds | Published Friday, October 16, 2015 | Last modified Wednesday, May 09, 2018

Captures interplay between fixed ethnic markers and culturally evolved tags in the evolution of cooperation and ethnocentrism. Agents evolve cultural tags, behavioural game strategies and in-group definitions. Ethnic markers are fixed.

Evolution of cooperation with strangers

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 15, 2010 | Last modified Wednesday, November 13, 2013

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

Variations on the Ethnocentrism Model of Hammond and Axelrod

Fredrik Jansson | Published Saturday, November 10, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

Agents co-operate or defect towards other agents in a prisoner’s dilemma, with strategy choice depending on whether agents share tags or are kin in different social structures.

Agent-Based Model for the Evolution of Ethnocentrism

Max Hartshorn | Published Saturday, March 24, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This is an implementation of an agent based model for the evolution of ethnocentrism. While based off a model published by Hammond and Axelrod (2006), the code has been modified to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of evolutionary dynamics.

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Complex Networks with Agents' Adaptive Expectations

Bo Xianyu | Published Wednesday, November 16, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

The provided source code is the result of our efforts in replicating Epstein’s Demographic Prisoner’s Dilemma. The simulation model is written in Repast/J 3.1.

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