Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.

C++ and Netlogo models presented in G. Bravo (2011), “Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management”. Rationality and Society 23(1).

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

In this presentation, we use the concept of meme to explore evolution of demand.

CRESY-I stands for CREativity from a SYstems perspetive, Model I. This is the base model in a series designed to describe a systems approach to creativity in terms of variation, selection and retention (VSR) subprocesses.

Cultural group selection model of agents playing public good games and who are able to punish and punish back.

Simulates biobehavioral interactions between 2 populations of hominins.

The model simulates the process of widespread diffusion of something due to popularity (i.e., bandwagon) within an organization.

The (cultural) evolution of cooperative breeding in harsh environments.