A simple model illustrating RA Fisher’s (1930) reconciliation of Darwinian selection with particulate genetic contributions.

We consider scientific communities where each scientist employs one of two characteristic methods: an “adequate” method (A) and a “superior” method (S). The quality of methodology is relevant to the epistemic products of these scientists, and generate credit for their users. Higher-credit methods tend to be imitated, allowing to explore whether communities will adopt one method or the other. We use the model to examine the effects of (1) bias for existing methods, (2) competence to assess relative value of competing methods, and (3) two forms of interdisciplinarity: (a) the tendency for members of a scientific community to receive meaningful credit assignment from those outside their community, and (b) the tendency to consider new methods used outside their community. The model can be used to show how interdisciplinarity can overcome the effects of bias and incompetence for the spread of superior methods.

This model aims to examine how different levels of communication noise and superiority bias affect team performance when solving problems collectively. We used a networked agent-based model of collective problem solving in which agents explore the NK landscape for a better solution and communicate with each other regarding their current solutions. We compared the team performance in solving problems collectively at different levels of self-superiority bias when facing simple and complex problems. Additionally, we addressed the effect of different levels of communication noise on the team’s outcome

We develop a spatial, evolutionary model of the endogenous formation and dissolution of groups using a renewable common pool resource. We use this foundation to measure the evolutionary pressures at different organizational levels.

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.

A dynamic model of social network formation on single-layer and multiplex networks with structural incentives that vary over time.

Dynamic bipartite network model of agents and games in which agents can participate in multiple public goods games.

The (cultural) evolution of cooperative breeding in harsh environments.

A general model of human mate choice in which agents are localized in space, interact with close neighbors, and tend to range either near or far. At the individual level, our model uses two oft-used but incompletely understood decision rules: one based on preferences for similar partners, the other for maximally attractive partners.

A model of innovation diffusion in a structured population with two groups who are averse to adopting a produce popular with the outgroup.