Technical University of Košice
ORCID more infohttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0535-7928
GitHub more infoNo bio entered.
This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.
This is a conceptual model of underlying forces creating industrial clusters. There are two contradictory forces - attraction and repulsion. Firms within the same Industry are attracted to each other and on the other hand, firms with the same Activity are repulsed from each other. In each round firm with the lowest fitness is selected to change its profile of Industries and Activities. Based on these simple rules interesting patterns emerge.
Under development.