In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, public health authorities around the world have experimented, in a short period of time, with various combinations of interventions at different scales. However, as the pandemic continues to progress, there is a growing need for tools and methodologies to quickly analyze the impact of these interventions and answer concrete questions regarding their effectiveness, range and temporality.

COMOKIT, the COVID-19 modeling kit, is such a tool. It is a computer model that allows intervention strategies to be explored in silico before their possible implementation phase. It can take into account important dimensions of policy actions, such as the heterogeneity of individual responses or the spatial aspect of containment strategies.

In COMOKIT, built using the agent-based modeling and simulation platform GAMA, the profiles, activities and interactions of people, person-to-person and environmental transmissions, individual clinical statuses, public health policies and interventions are explicitly represented and they all serve as a basis for describing the dynamics of the epidemic in a detailed and realistic representation of space.

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We study three obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming in the Mekong Delta (MKD) region. The failure of buyers in building trust-based relationship with small-holder farmers, unattractive offered prices from the contract farming scheme, and limited rice processing capacity have constrained contractors from participating in the large-scale paddy field program. We present an agent-based model to examine the viability of contract farming in the region from the contractor perspective.

The model focuses on financial incentives and trust, which affect the decision of relevant parties on whether to participate and honor a contract. The model is also designed in the context of the MKD’s rice supply chain with two contractors engaging in the contract rice farming scheme alongside an open market, in which both parties can renege on the agreement. We then evaluate the contractors’ performances with different combinations of scenarios related to the three obstacles.

Our results firstly show that a fully-equipped contractor who opportunistically exploits a relatively small proportion (less than 10%) of the contracted farmers in most instances can outperform spot market-based contractors in terms of average profit achieved for each crop. Secondly, a committed contractor who offers lower purchasing prices than the most typical rate can obtain better earnings per ton of rice as well as higher profit per crop. However, those contractors in both cases could not enlarge their contract farming scheme, since either farmers’ trust toward them decreases gradually or their offers are unable to compete with the benefits from a competitor or the spot market. Thirdly, the results are also in agreement with the existing literature that the contract farming scheme is not a cost-effective method for buyers with limited rice processing capacity, which is a common situation among the contractors in the MKD region.