The purpose of the model is to examine whether and how mobile pastoralists are able to achieve an Ideal Free Distribution (IFD).

This model simulates a bank - firm credit network.

The code contains four experiments for well-being based IMRL reward features.

In this paper we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different parties but deem some of them as inadmissible and try to block them from office. We find that the most stable and durable coalition governments emerge at intermediate levels of informational ambiguity. When voters have very poor information about the parties, their votes are scattered too widely, preventing the emergence of robust majorities. But also, voters with highly precise perceptions about the parties will cluster around tiny electoral niches with a similar aggregate effect.

The purpose of the simulation was to explore and better understand the process of bridging between an analysis of qualitative data and the specification of a simulation. This may be developed for more serious processes later but at the moment it is merely an illustration.
This exercise was done by Stephanie Dornschneider (School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin) and Bruce Edmonds to inform the discussion at the Lorentz workshop on “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Data using Social Simulation” at Leiden in April 2019. The qualitative data was collected and analysed by SD. The model specification was developed as the result of discussion by BE & SD. The model was programmed by BE. This is described in a paper submitted to Social Simulation 2019 and (to some extent) in the slides presented at the workshop.

Previous research on organizations often focuses on either the individual, team, or organizational level. There is a lack of multidimensional research on emergent phenomena and interactions between the mechanisms at different levels. This paper takes a multifaceted perspective on individual learning and autonomous group formation and turnover. To analyze interactions between the two levels, we introduce an agent-based model that captures an organization with a population of heterogeneous agents who learn and are limited in their rationality. To solve a task, agents form a group that can be adapted from time to time. We explore organizations that promote learning and group turnover either simultaneously or sequentially and analyze the interactions between the activities and the effects on performance. We observe underproportional interactions when tasks are interdependent and show that pushing learning and group turnover too far might backfire and decrease performance significantly.

This model takes concepts from a JASSS paper this is accepted for the October, 2023 edition and applies the concepts to empirical data from counties surrounding and including Cleveland Ohio. The agent-based model has a proportional number of agents in each of the counties to represent the correct proportions of adults in these counties. The adoption decision probability uses the equations from Bass (1969) as adapted by Rand & Rust (2011). It also includes the Outgroup aversion factor from Smaldino, who initially had used a different imitation model on line grid. This model uses preferential attachment network as a metaphor for social networks influencing adoption. The preferential network can be adjusted in the model to be created based on both nodes preferred due to higher rank as well as a mild preference for nodes of a like group.

This model is linked to the paper “The Epistemic Role of Diversity in Juries: An Agent-Based Model”. There are many version of this model, but the current version focuses on the role of diversity in whether juries reach correct verdicts. Using this agent-based model, we argue that diversity can play at least four importantly different roles in affecting jury verdicts. (1) Where different subgroups have access to different information, equal representation can strengthen epistemic jury success. (2) If one subgroup has access to particularly strong evidence, epistemic success may demand participation by that group. (3) Diversity can also reduce the redundancy of the information on which a jury focuses, which can have a positive impact. (4) Finally, and most surprisingly, we show that limiting communication between diverse groups in juries can favor epistemic success as well.

Agents co-operate or defect towards other agents in a prisoner’s dilemma, with strategy choice depending on whether agents share tags or are kin in different social structures.

The model represents a team intended at designing a methodology for Institutional Planning. Included in ICAART’14 to exemplify how emotions can be identified in SocLab; and in ESSA’14 to show the Efficiency of Organizational Withdrawal vs Commitment.