Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

The model of market of one commodity , in which there are in each moment of time the same quantity and the same quantity of money was formulated and researched in this text. We also study this system as a game of automata.

This model simulates the heterogeneity of preferences in a PG game and how the interaction between them affects the dynamics of voluntary contributions. Model is based on the results of a human-based experiment.

Cultural group selection model of agents playing public good games and who are able to punish and punish back.

We build a computational model to investigate, in an evolutionary setting, a series of questions pertaining to happiness.

This is one of four extensions to the standard Adder model that replicate the various interventions typical of transition experiments.

One of four extensions to the standard Adder model that replicates a common type of transition experiment.

MERCURY aims to represent and explore two descriptive models of the functioning of the Roman trade system that aim to explain the observed strong differences in the wideness of distributions of Roman tableware.

DIAL is a model of group dynamics and opinion dynamics. It features dialogues, in which agents put their reputation at stake. Intra-group radicalisation of opinions appears to be an emergent phenomenon.

Comparing 7 alternative models of human behavior and assess their performance on a high resolution dataset based on individual behavior performance in laboratory experiments.