This model simulates the heterogeneity of preferences in a PG game and how the interaction between them affects the dynamics of voluntary contributions. Model is based on the results of a human-based experiment.

We model the epistemic dynamics preceding political uprising. Before deciding whether to start protests, agents need to estimate the amount of discontent with the regime. This model simulates the dynamics of group knowledge about general discontent.

Transhumants move their herds based on strategies simultaneously considering several environmental and socio-economic factors. There is no agreement on the influence of each factor in these strategies. In addition, there is a discussion about the social aspect of transhumance and how to manage pastoral space. In this context, agent-based modeling can analyze herd movements according to the strategy based on factors favored by the transhumant. This article presents a reductionist agent-based model that simulates herd movements based on a single factor. Model simulations based on algorithms to formalize the behavioral dynamics of transhumants through their strategies. The model results establish that vegetation, water outlets and the socio-economic network of transhumants have a significant temporal impact on transhumance. Water outlets and the socio-economic network have a significant spatial impact. The significant impact of the socio-economic factor demonstrates the social dimension of Sahelian transhumance. Veterinarians and markets have an insignificant spatio-temporal impact. To manage pastoral space, water outlets should be at least 15 km
from each other. The construction of veterinary centers, markets and the securitization of transhumance should be carried out close to villages and rangelands.

The Hohokam Trade Networks Model focuses on key features of the Hohokam economy to explore how differences in trade network topologies may show up in the archaeological record. The model is set in the Phoenix Basin of central Arizona, AD 200-1450.

The CHIME ABM explores information distribution networks and agents’ protective decision making in the context of hurricane landfall.

The computer model simulates the development of a social network (i.e. formation of friendships and cliques), the (dyadic) interactions between pupils and the development of similarities and differences in their behavioral profiles.

This model is to simulate and compare the admission effects of 3 school matching mechanisms, serial dictatorship, Boston mechanism, and Chinese Parallel, under different settings of information released.

The model simulates flood damages and its propagation through a cooperative, productive, farming system, characterized as a star-type network, where all elements in the system are connected one to each other through a central element.

We study three obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming in the Mekong Delta (MKD) region. The failure of buyers in building trust-based relationship with small-holder farmers, unattractive offered prices from the contract farming scheme, and limited rice processing capacity have constrained contractors from participating in the large-scale paddy field program. We present an agent-based model to examine the viability of contract farming in the region from the contractor perspective.

The model focuses on financial incentives and trust, which affect the decision of relevant parties on whether to participate and honor a contract. The model is also designed in the context of the MKD’s rice supply chain with two contractors engaging in the contract rice farming scheme alongside an open market, in which both parties can renege on the agreement. We then evaluate the contractors’ performances with different combinations of scenarios related to the three obstacles.

Our results firstly show that a fully-equipped contractor who opportunistically exploits a relatively small proportion (less than 10%) of the contracted farmers in most instances can outperform spot market-based contractors in terms of average profit achieved for each crop. Secondly, a committed contractor who offers lower purchasing prices than the most typical rate can obtain better earnings per ton of rice as well as higher profit per crop. However, those contractors in both cases could not enlarge their contract farming scheme, since either farmers’ trust toward them decreases gradually or their offers are unable to compete with the benefits from a competitor or the spot market. Thirdly, the results are also in agreement with the existing literature that the contract farming scheme is not a cost-effective method for buyers with limited rice processing capacity, which is a common situation among the contractors in the MKD region.

Quality uncertainty and market failure: an interactive model to conduct classroom experiments