The Non-Deterministic model of affordable housing Negotiations (NoD-Neg) is designed for generating hypotheses about the possible outcomes of negotiating affordable housing obligations in new developments in England. By outcomes we mean, the probabilities of failing the negotiation and/or the different possibilities of agreement.
The model focuses on two negotiations which are key in the provision of affordable housing. The first is between a developer (DEV) who is submitting a planning application for approval and the relevant Local Planning Authority (LPA) who is responsible for reviewing the application and enforcing the affordable housing obligations. The second negotiation is between the developer and a Registered Social Landlord (RSL) who buys the affordable units from the developer and rents them out. They can negotiate the price of selling the affordable units to the RSL.
The model runs the two negotiations on the same development project several times to enable agents representing stakeholders to apply different negotiation tactics (different agendas and concession-making tactics), hence, explore the different possibilities of outcomes.
The model produces three types of outputs: (i) histograms showing the distribution of the negotiation outcomes in all the simulation runs and the probability of each outcome; (ii) a data file with the exact values shown in the histograms; and (iii) a conversation log detailing the exchange of messages between agents in each simulation run.

Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens.

To assess the effectiveness of fully or partially enforce tax policies, this agent based model has been ran many times under different enforcement rules, which influence the perceived enforced- and voluntary compliance, as the slippery-slope model prescribes. Based on the dynamics of this perception and the extent to which agents influence each other, the annual amounts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxes paid are calculated over longer periods of time.

The agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

The goal of the paper is to propose an abstract but formalised model of how Schwartz higher order values may influence individual decisions on sharing an individual effort among alternative economic activities. Subsequently, individual decisions are aggregated into the total (collective) economic output, taking into account interactions between the agents. In particular, we explore the relationship between individual higher order values: Self–Enhancement, Self–Transcendence, Openness to Change, and Conservation – measured according to Schwartz’s universal human values theory – and individual and collective economic performance, by means of a theoretical agent based model. Furthermore, based on empirical observations, Openness to Change (measured by the population average in the case of collective output) is positively associated with individual and collective output. These relations are negative for Conservation. Self-Enhancement is positively associated with individual output but negatively with collective output. In case of Self–Transcendence, this effect is opposite. The model provides the potential explanations, in terms of individual and population differences in: propensity for management, willingness to change, and skills (measured by an educational level) for the empirically observed relations between Schwartz higher order values and individual and collective output. We directly calibrate the micro–level of the model using data from the ninth round of the European Social Survey (ESS9) and present the results of numerical simulations.

The model explores the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance among diverse agents, including individual taxpayers and a tax authority. It incorporates heterogeneous preferences and income endowments among taxpayers, captured through a utility function that considers psychic costs subtracted from expected pecuniary utility. These costs include moral, reciprocity, and stigma costs associated with norm violations, leading to variations in taxpayers’ risk attitudes and related parameters. The tax authority’s attributes, such as the frequency of random audits, penalty rate, and the choice between partial or full disclosure, remain fixed throughout the simulation. Income endowments and preference parameters are randomly assigned to taxpayers at the outset.

Taxpayers maximize their expected utility by reporting income, taking into account tax, penalty, and audit rates. They make annual decisions based on their own and their peers’ behaviors from the previous year. Taxpayers indirectly interact at the societal level through public disclosure conducted by the tax authority, exchanging tax information among peers. Each period in the simulation collects data on total reported income, average compliance rates per income group, distribution of compliance rates, counts of compliers, full evaders, partial evaders, and the numbers of taxpayers experiencing guilt and anger. The model evaluates whether public disclosure positively or negatively impacts compliance rates and quantifies this impact based on aggregated individual reporting behaviors.

This model simulates diffusion curves and it allows to test how social influence, network structure and consumer heterogeneity affect their spreads and their speeds.

A stylized scale model to codesign with villagers an agent-based model of bushmeat hunting in the periphery of Korup National Park (Cameroon)

The model explores how two types of information - social (in the form of pheromone trails) and private (in the form of route memories) affect ant colony level foraging in a variable enviroment.

This adaptation of the Relative Agreement model of opinion dynamics (Deffuant et al. 2002) extends the Meadows and Cliff (2012) implementation of this model in a manner that explores the effect of the network structure among the agents.

The FishCensus model simulates underwater visual census methods, where a diver estimates the abundance of fish. A separate model is used to shape species behaviours and save them to a file that can be shared and used by the counting model.

The model studies the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous farmers. Based on their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperative farmers choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement.