Inspired by the SKIN model, the basic concept here is to model the acceptance and implementation of supplier innovations. This model includes three types of agents comprising suppliers, manufacturers and applicators.

This generic agent-based model simulates the evolution of agent’s opinions through their exchange of arguments.
The idea behind this model is to explicitly represent the process of mental deliberation of agents from arguments to an opinion, through the use of Dung’s argumentation framework complemented by a structured description of arguments. An application of the model on the diffusion of vegetarian diets is proposed.

The Regional Security Game is a iterated public goods game with punishement based on based on life sciences work by Boyd et al. (2003 ) and Hintze & Adami (2015 ), with modifications appropriate for an international relations setting. The game models a closed regional system in which states compete over the distribution of common security benefits. Drawing on recent work applying cultural evolutionary paradigms in the social sciences, states learn through imitation of successful strategies rather than making instrumentally rational choices. The model includes the option to fit empirical data to the model, with two case studies included: Europe in 1933 on the verge of war and south-east Asia in 2013.

Used in working paper: MEASURING COLLECTIVE COGNITION IN ONLINE CONVERSATIONS

A dynamic model of social network formation on single-layer and multiplex networks with structural incentives that vary over time.

A model of innovation diffusion in a structured population with two groups who are averse to adopting a produce popular with the outgroup.

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.

Dynamic bipartite network model of agents and games in which agents can participate in multiple public goods games.

The (cultural) evolution of cooperative breeding in harsh environments.

A fisher directed management system was describeded by Hart (2021). It was proposed that fishers should only be allowed to exploit a resource if they collaborated in a resource management system for which they would own and be collectively responsible for. As part of the system fishers would need to follow the rules of exploitation set by the group and provide a central unit with data with which to monitor the fishery. Any fisher not following the rules would at first be fined but eventually expelled from the fishery if he/she continued to act selfishly. This version of the model establishes the dynamics of a fleet of vessels and controls overfishing by imposing fines on fishers whose income is low and who are tempted to keep fishing beyond the set quota which is established each year depending on the abundance of the fish stock. This version will later be elaborated to have interactions between the fishers including pressure to comply with the norms set by the group and which could lead to a stable management system.