Simulations based on the Axelrod model and extensions to inspect the volatility of the features over time (AXELROD MODEL & Agreement threshold & two model variations based on the Social identity approach)
The Axelrod model is used to predict the number of changes per feature in comparison to the datasets and is used to compare different model variations and their performance.

Input: Real data

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The model explores the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance among diverse agents, including individual taxpayers and a tax authority. It incorporates heterogeneous preferences and income endowments among taxpayers, captured through a utility function that considers psychic costs subtracted from expected pecuniary utility. These costs include moral, reciprocity, and stigma costs associated with norm violations, leading to variations in taxpayers’ risk attitudes and related parameters. The tax authority’s attributes, such as the frequency of random audits, penalty rate, and the choice between partial or full disclosure, remain fixed throughout the simulation. Income endowments and preference parameters are randomly assigned to taxpayers at the outset.

Taxpayers maximize their expected utility by reporting income, taking into account tax, penalty, and audit rates. They make annual decisions based on their own and their peers’ behaviors from the previous year. Taxpayers indirectly interact at the societal level through public disclosure conducted by the tax authority, exchanging tax information among peers. Each period in the simulation collects data on total reported income, average compliance rates per income group, distribution of compliance rates, counts of compliers, full evaders, partial evaders, and the numbers of taxpayers experiencing guilt and anger. The model evaluates whether public disclosure positively or negatively impacts compliance rates and quantifies this impact based on aggregated individual reporting behaviors.

This model was utilized for the simulation in the paper titled Effect of Network Homophily and Partisanship on Social Media to “Oil Spill” Polarizations. It allows you to examine whether oil spill polarization occurs through people’s communication under various conditions.

・Choose the network construction conditions you’d like to examine from the “rewire-style” chooser box.
・Select the desired strength of partisanship from the “partisanlevel” chooser box. You can also set the strength manually in the code tab.
・You can set the number of dynamic topics using the “number-of-topics” slider.
・Use the “divers-of-opinion” slider to set the number of preference types for each dynamic topic.
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This model is an agent-based simulation designed to explore how climate-induced environmental degradation can contribute to the emergence of social violence in coastal communities that depend heavily on ecosystem services for their livelihoods. The model represents a coupled social–ecological system in which environmental shocks—such as sea level rise and marine ecosystem decline—affect local economic conditions, food security, and community stability.

Agents in the model represent individuals whose livelihoods depend on coastal ecosystems. Environmental degradation reduces ecosystem productivity and increases economic hardship, which can lead to the formation of grievances among agents. The model incorporates behavioral thresholds that determine how individuals respond to hardship and perceived injustice. Under certain conditions—particularly when institutional capacity and law enforcement effectiveness are limited—these grievances may escalate into violent behavior.

The simulation allows users to explore how different climate scenarios, levels of ecosystem degradation, livelihood dependence, and institutional responses influence the probability of social instability and violence. By modeling the interactions between environmental stress, socio-economic vulnerability, and governance capacity, the model provides a computational framework for examining potential pathways linking climate change and conflict in coastal social–ecological systems.

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This paper develops a spatial agent-based model to examine how fertility regime shifts reshape population concentration and wealth distribution in an abstract urban system. Migration decisions combine population preference, cultural homophily, expected net income, and resource endowment through a standardised softmax utility. The design is deliberately stylised: it is not calibrated to a particular country or city system, but is intended to isolate the feedbacks linking migration, fertility, urban scaling, and accumulated wealth.
The simulations reveal robust directional asymmetry. When fertility shifts from low to high, population concentration responds rapidly; when fertility shifts from high to low, concentration declines only after a detectable delay and may temporarily continue in the previous direction. Wealth adds a second layer of hysteresis: cell total-wealth concentration follows population concentration with delay, cell mean-wealth inequality and system-level wealth indicators are slower still, and phase-space trajectories form loops rather than collapsing onto a single population–wealth curve. Robustness experiments indicate that longer fertility cycles, wider mobility neighbourhoods, and smoother resource landscapes change the magnitude of delay and overshoot, but do not remove the qualitative asymmetry. The paper argues that demographic decline should be understood not as the mirror image of demographic expansion, but as a path-dependent transition mediated by fast migration-income feedbacks and slower fertility, cohort, culture, and wealth mechanisms.

MOSAIC is an agent-based NetLogo model of decentralized mission coordination among heterogeneous robots operating under partial observability, limited energy, spatially variable risk, dynamic communication, and individual and cooperative task requirements. Robots discover tasks locally, exchange task information through temporary communication links, submit capability-, energy-, deadline-, and risk-aware bids, compete for individual contracts, and form temporary coalitions for cooperative tasks.

The model integrates decentralized auctions, greedy capability-based coalition formation, contract release and reassignment, four reward regimes, reputation, adaptive bidding strategies, failure traceability, and mission-, network-, information-, inequality-, and coalition-level metrics. It operates without a centralized mission planner or global combinatorial assignment solver.

Seven paired-seed BehaviorSpace experiments comprising 690 official simulation runs evaluate baseline mission viability, reward regimes, communication structure, capability heterogeneity, cooperative-task demand, reputation and adaptive strategies, and mission-incentive strength. The results indicate that structural coordination capacity—particularly information reach, capability compatibility, and feasible coalition construction—has a stronger effect on mission completion than increasing incentive intensity within the tested architecture and parameter ranges.

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The TechNet_04 is an abstract model that embeds a simple cultural tranmission process in an environment where interaction is structured by spatially-situated networks.

This adaptation of the Relative Agreement model of opinion dynamics (Deffuant et al. 2002) extends the Meadows and Cliff (2012) implementation of this model in a manner that explores the effect of the network structure among the agents.

The model presented here was created as part of my dissertation. It aims to study the impacts of topography and climate change on prehistoric networks, with a focus on the Magdalenian, which is dated to between 20 and 14,000 years ago.

Motivated by the emergence of new Peer-to-Peer insurance organizations that rethink how insurance is organized, we propose a theoretical model of decision-making in risk-sharing arrangements with risk heterogeneity and incomplete information about the risk distribution as core features. For these new, informal organisations, the available institutional solutions to heterogeneity (e.g., mandatory participation or price differentiation) are either impossible or undesirable. Hence, we need to understand the scope conditions under which individuals are motivated to participate in a bottom-up risk-sharing setting. The model puts forward participation as a utility maximizing alternative for agents with higher risk levels, who are more risk averse, are driven more by solidarity motives, and less susceptible to cost fluctuations. This basic micro-level model is used to simulate decision-making for agent populations in a dynamic, interdependent setting. Simulation results show that successful risk-sharing arrangements may work if participants are driven by motivations of solidarity or risk aversion, but this is less likely in populations more heterogeneous in risk, as the individual motivations can less often make up for the larger cost deficiencies. At the same time, more heterogeneous groups deal better with uncertainty and temporary cost fluctuations than more homogeneous populations do. In the latter, cascades following temporary peaks in support requests more often result in complete failure, while under full information about the risk distribution this would not have happened.