The fight against poverty is an urgent global challenge. Microinsurance is promoted as a valuable instrument for buffering income losses due to health or climate-related risks of low-income households in developing countries. However, apart from direct positive effects they can have unintended side effects when insured households lower their contribution to traditional arrangements where risk is shared through private monetary support.

RiskNetABM is an agent-based model that captures dynamics between income losses, insurance payments and informal risk-sharing. The model explicitly includes decisions about informal transfers. It can be used to assess the impact of insurance products and informal risk-sharing arrangements on the resilience of smallholders. Specifically, it allows to analyze whether and how economic needs (i.e. level of living costs) and characteristics of extreme events (i.e. frequency, intensity and type of shock) influence the ability of insurance and informal risk-sharing to buffer income shocks. Two types of behavior with regard to private monetary transfers are explicitly distinguished: (1) all households provide transfers whenever they can afford it and (2) insured households do not show solidarity with their uninsured peers.

The model is stylized and is not used to analyze a particular case study, but represents conditions from several regions with different risk contexts where informal risk-sharing networks between smallholder farmers are prevalent.

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This model is designed to show the effects of personality types and student organizations have on ones chance to making friendships in a university setting. As known from psychology studies, those that are extroverted have an easier chance making friendships in comparison to those that are introverted.
Once every tick a pair of students (nodes) will be randomly selected they will then have the chance to either be come friends or not (create an edge or not) based on their personality type (you are able to change what the effect of each personality is) and whether or not they are in the same club (you can change this value) then the model triggers the next tick cycle to begin.

Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens.

To assess the effectiveness of fully or partially enforce tax policies, this agent based model has been ran many times under different enforcement rules, which influence the perceived enforced- and voluntary compliance, as the slippery-slope model prescribes. Based on the dynamics of this perception and the extent to which agents influence each other, the annual amounts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxes paid are calculated over longer periods of time.

The agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

Digital-Twin model of Sejong City – Source model code & data

We only shared model codes, excluding private data and simulation engine codes.
The followings are brief reasons for the items we cannot share.

1. Residence address data
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MoPAgrIB model simulates the movement of cultivated patches in a savannah vegetation mosaic ; how they move and relocate through the landscape, depending on farming practices, population growth, social rules and vegetation growth.

This model extends the original Artifical Anasazi (AA) model to include individual agents, who vary in age and sex, and are aggregated into households. This allows more realistic simulations of population dynamics within the Long House Valley of Arizona from AD 800 to 1350 than are possible in the original model. The parts of this model that are directly derived from the AA model are based on Janssen’s 1999 Netlogo implementation of the model; the code for all extensions and adaptations in the model described here (the Artificial Long House Valley (ALHV) model) have been written by the authors. The AA model included only ideal and homogeneous “individuals” who do not participate in the population processes (e.g., birth and death)–these processes were assumed to act on entire households only. The ALHV model incorporates actual individual agents and all demographic processes affect these individuals. Individuals are aggregated into households that participate in annual agricultural and demographic cycles. Thus, the ALHV model is a combination of individual processes (birth and death) and household-level processes (e.g., finding suitable agriculture plots).

As is the case for the AA model, the ALHV model makes use of detailed archaeological and paleoenvironmental data from the Long House Valley and the adjacent areas in Arizona. It also uses the same methods as the original model (from Janssen’s Netlogo implementation) to estimate annual maize productivity of various agricultural zones within the valley. These estimates are used to determine suitable locations for households and farms during each year of the simulation.

Schelling and Sakoda prominently proposed computational models suggesting that strong ethnic residential segregation can be the unintended outcome of a self-reinforcing dynamic driven by choices of individuals with rather tolerant ethnic preferences. There are only few attempts to apply this view to school choice, another important arena in which ethnic segregation occurs. In the current paper, we explore with an agent-based theoretical model similar to those proposed for residential segregation, how ethnic tolerance among parents can affect the level of school segregation. More specifically, we ask whether and under which conditions school segregation could be reduced if more parents hold tolerant ethnic preferences. We move beyond earlier models of school segregation in three ways. First, we model individual school choices using a random utility discrete choice approach. Second, we vary the pattern of ethnic segregation in the residential context of school choices systematically, comparing residential maps in which segregation is unrelated to parents’ level of tolerance to residential maps reflecting their ethnic preferences. Third, we introduce heterogeneity in tolerance levels among parents belonging to the same group. Our simulation experiments suggest that ethnic school segregation can be a very robust phenomenon, occurring even when about half of the population prefers mixed to segregated schools. However, we also identify a “sweet spot” in the parameter space in which a larger proportion of tolerant parents makes the biggest difference. This is the case when parents have moderate preferences for nearby schools and there is only little residential segregation. Further experiments are presented that unravel the underlying mechanisms.

A first version of a model that describes how coalitions are formed during open, networked innovation

Municipal waste management (MWM) is essential for urban development. Efficient waste management is essential for providing a healthy and clean environment, for reducing GHGs and for increasing the amount of material recycled. Waste separation at source is perceived as an effective MWM strategy that relays on the behaviour of citizens to separate their waste in different fractions. The strategy is straightforward, and many cities have adopted the strategy or are working to implement it. However, the success of such strategy depends on adequate understanding of the drivers of the behaviour of proper waste sorting. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) has been extensively applied to explain the behaviour of waste sorting and contributes to determining the importance of different psychological constructs. Although, evidence shows its validity in different contexts, without exploring how urban policies and the built environment affect the TPB, its application to urban challenges remains unlocked. To date, limited research has focused in exposing how different urban situations such as: distance to waste bins, conditions of recycling facilities or information campaigns affect the planned behaviour of waste separation. To fill this gap, an agent-based model (ABM) of residents capable of planning the behaviour of waste separation is developed. The study is a proof of concept that shows how the TPB can be combined with simulations to provide useful insights to evaluate different urban planning situations. In this paper we depart from a survey to capture TPB constructs, then Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used to validate the TPB hypothesis and extract the drivers of the behaviour of waste sorting. Finally, the development of the ABM is detailed and the drivers of the TPB are used to determine how the residents behave. A low-density and a high-density urban scenario are used to extract policy insights. In conclusion, the integration between the TPB into ABMs can help to bridge the knowledge gap between can provide a useful insight to analysing and evaluating waste management scenarios in urban areas. By better understanding individual waste sorting behaviour, we can develop more effective policies and interventions to promote sustainable waste management practices.

The model is an agent-based artificial stock market where investors connect in a dynamic network. The network is dynamic in the sense that the investors, at specified intervals, decide whether to keep their current adviser (those investors they receive trading advise from). The investors also gain information from a private source and share public information about the risky asset. Investors have different tendencies to follow the different information sources, consider differing amounts of history, and have different thresholds for investing.